The Authenticity of Traditions:

A critique of Joseph Schacht’s Argument e Silentio

 Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari

ne of the major theses which has gained general acceptance among Western scholars of early Islam is that the traditions (aḥādīth) from the Prophet (peace be on him) or from his Companions belong, on the whole, to a period considerably later than that to which they are ascribed. These traditions, it is claimed, arose as a cumulative result of attributing doctrines (in fact arrived at by individual reasoning), via a chain of authorities all the way to the Prophet and his Companions. The obvious motive for doing this on the part of different persons or schools was to gain an authoritative character for their respective doctrines. Put in plain terms, this thesis claims that the corpus of traditions from the Prophet is largely the product of a large‑scale, pious forgery.

I

The trend of questioning, and in fact denying the authenticity of traditions was already evident during the second half of the nineteenth century in the works of prominent Western scholars such as William Muir, Aloys Sprenger, Alfred von Kremer and Theodore Noeldeke.[1] It was, however, in the writings of Ignaz Goldziher, (whose second volume of Muhammedanische Studien is devoted to a critical study of Ḥadīth), that this trend found its first most sustained and vigorous expression. Goldziher’s main argument was that the traditions reflect the attitudes and viewpoints obtaining in the second and third Islamic centuries and have little to ten about the early part of the first century to which they allegedly belong. This argument instantly, gained a wide acceptance among the Western scholars of Islam, and has since remained with them as an established thesis.[2]

After Goldziher a number of Western scholars have used the traditions extensively as a source material in their studies on the early centuries of Islam. Among them two stand out very promi­nently: A.J. Wensinck and Joseph Schacht. Wensinck used the tra­ditions with a theological bearing to study the development of Islamic theology and adopted broadly the same approach as Goldziher’s.[3] Schacht, on the other hand, concerned himself with the “origins” of Muslim jurisprudence and hence considered the role of the traditions in the development of Muslim law– in the development of both substantive doctrines and of legal theory. He not only confirmed Goldziher’s essential thesis but went consider­ably beyond him. He claimed that the tracing of traditions back to the Prophet was developed very late in Islam; that a considerable number of legal traditions from the Prophet were “put into circu­lation” after circa 150 A. H. which, according to him, marks the beginning of the “literary” period of Ḥadīth transmission. Schacht’s scepticism was even more rigorous than Goldziher’s. This would be evident from the “methodical rule”, which, according to Schacht, follows from Goldziher’s results. Schacht has expressed this in the following words: [4]

... every legal tradition from the Prophet, until the contrary is proved, must be taken not as an authentic or essentially authentic, even if, slightly obscured, statement valid for his time or the time of the Companions, but as the fictitious expression of a legal doctrine formulated at a later date.

This was Schacht’s position in Origins that appeared in 1950. Fourteen years later when Introduction came out, he appears to have moved to a position which seems even more pronouncedly extreme: “Hardly any of these traditions, as far as matters of religious law are concerned, can be considered authentic ......[5]

Schacht has frequently used the argument e silentio to show the non‑existence of many traditions in the early period of Islam. This argument, in his own words, consists of the following:[6]

The best way of proving that a tradition did not exist at a certain time is to show that it was not used as a legal argument in a discussion which would have made reference to it imperat­ive, if it had existed... This kind of conclusion is furthermore made safe by Tr. VIII, 11, where Shaybānī says: “Thing is so unless the Medinese can produce a tradition in support of their doctrine, but they have none, or they would have produced it.” We may safely assume that the legal traditions with which we are concerned were quoted as arguments by those whose doctrine they were intended to support, as soon as they were put into circulation.

In his actual resort to this argument, however, Schacht is not con­sistently mindful of his own restrictive stipulation, viz., “that a tradition would be deemed non‑existent at a certain time if it was not used as an argument in a discussion which would have made reference to it imperative.” [7] His slipshod resort to this argument would seem to suggest that the Muslim scholars of the second and third centuries were in a perpetual state of “discussion”, an assump­tion which is patently unacceptable to common sense.

The present paper is not concerned with the question of the authenticity of traditions, nor with Schacht’s views on that question as such. Rather it is addressed exclusively to Schacht’s e silentio argument on which he mainly bases his case for the non-authenticity of traditions.

II

Even a casual reading of the Origins makes it evident that Schacht’s “methodical rule” and his line of argumentation are highly sweeping. It would seem altogether unreasonable to claim validity for Schacht’s argument unless we were to make the following assumptions:

1)    that during the first two centuries of Islam whenever legal doctrines were recorded, their supporting arguments, especially the traditions, were also consistently mentioned;

2)    that the traditions known to a jurist (or traditionist) would necessarily have been known to all the other jurists (and traditionists) of his time;

3)    that all the traditions which were “in circulation” at a particular period of time were duly recorded, were widely publicised and were subsequently preserved so that if we fail to find a tradition in the works of a known scholar that is tantamount to its non‑existence in his time – in his own region as well as elsewhere in the realm of Islam.

None of these assumptions can be corroborated by historical evidence. In fact, it can be positively shown that they do not cohere with the known facts of the period concerned.

The earliest works embodying traditions which have come down to us were composed around the middle of the second century and subsequently.[8] The composition of these works was motivated by a complex of factors. One of these was the desire to record the doctrines followed by the scholar’s predecessors, especially the generally accepted doctrines of his school. It was for this reason that often it was deemed sufficient to record the doctrines of one’s school, without necessarily recording alongside in support of those doctrines, traditions from the Prophet or Companions.[9]

It is well known that many doctrines derived from the Qur’an were recorded in these writings without any reference to the relevant Qur’anic verses.[10] There is ample evidence to show that this was equally true in regard to traditions. There is a great number of instances where a jurist recorded the doctrine of his school on a legal question but did not care to cite the tradition which was relevant to, and/or was supportive of his doctrine, even though it can be incontrovertibly shown that he knew that tradition.[11] Indeed, it would be interesting to explore the traditions found in the earlier works but not found in later works. This would mean working on the reverse of Schacht’s assumption, and would, we may presume, produce quite startling results. We carried this out on a limited scale and found it of considerable significance. For if it can be shown– and in our view it can– that a large number of traditions found in earlier works are not found in works of a later period, let alone in contemporaneous works, and that the jurists of the period under discussion often felt themselves under no obli­gation to cite the many traditions which were known to them, even those that supported their doctrines, the ground of Schacht’s argument is seriously put in doubt. In the following pages we have essayed a comparative study of a fair assortment of legal doctrines of some second century jurists to illustrate the inadequacy of Schacht’s assumptions.

We would start our study by comparing the two Muwaṭṭas, viz., those of Mālik and Shaybānī. Mālik’s Muwaṭṭa’, as we know, is a repertory of the legal doctrines of the Medinese school and also a major early collection of aḥādīth. Mālik (b. circa 95 A.H.), the founder of the Mālikī school, was considerably older than Shaybānī (b. 132 A.H.). Shaybānī, who belonged to the legal school of Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150 A.H.), prepared an edition of Mālik’s Muwaṭṭa’. Besides incorporating the opinions expressed, and the traditions recorded by Mālik, Shaybānī’s edition also presents the variant doctrines of the author and his school, occasionally followed by traditions in support of those doctrines.

A large number of traditions found in the Muwaṭṭa’ of Mālik are not to be found in the Muwaṭṭa’ of Shaybānī and this in spite of the fact that Shaybānī was the younger of the two.[12] What is even more curious is that occasionally the traditions of Mālik’s Muwaṭṭa’ [Muw.] which are supportive of the doctrines of Shaybānī’s school are not found in his Shaybānī’s Muwaṭṭa’[Muw. Sh.]. The following will illustrate this.

·                       The section on timings of the prayers in Muw. (pp. 3 ff.) contains in all 30 traditions, out of which only three have been mentioned in Muw.Sh. (pp. 42 ff.).

·                       On the question of the preferred time for morning prayer, the disagreement between the Kufans and the Medinese is well­ known. ‘The Medinese were in favour of performing the morn­ing prayer when it was still dark, while the Kufans were of the view that prayer should preferably be held a little later when there was some light. Muw. Sh. (p. 42) mentions this doctrine of the Kufans. Strangely enough, Shaybānī makes no mention of a tradition from the Prophet which is found in Muw. (pp. 4 f.) and which supports the doctrine of his school.[13]

·                       On the question whether touching of the genital parts necessit­ates fresh ablution, there are six traditions in Muw. (pp. 42 f.) whereas Muw.Sh. (p. 50) has only two. The omitted tradi­tions include one from the Prophet and another from Ibn ‘Urnar.

·                       On the question of ghusl owing to janāba, Muw. (pp. 44 L) has four traditions, out of which only one is found in Muw. Sh. (pp. 70 f.). The omitted traditions include two traditions from the Prophet.

·                       The Section entitled “Ghusl al‑mar’ā idhā ra’at fī al‑manām...” in Muw. (pp. 51 L) has two traditions whereas Muw. Sh. (p.79) has only one. Of these, the latter work does not contain the tradition that has been recorded in Muw. (pp. 51 L) as a tradition from the Prophet with the asnād: Mālik ‑ Umm Salina ‑ Umm Sulaym, ‑ the Prophet.

·                       The entire section entitled “al‑Wuḍū’ min al‑qubla” in Muw. (pp. 43 f.), is not found in Muw Sh.

·                       The whole section entitled “al‑ñāhūr fī al‑mā’ “ (Muw. pp. 22 ff.) is not found in Muw. Sh.

·                       The sections on ‑al‑Bawl qā’iman “ and on “al‑Siwāk”  (pp. 64 ff.) are not found in Muw. Sh.

·                       The section “al‑Nidā’ fī al‑ṣalā” (Muw. PP. 67 ff.), if compared with the corresponding section in Muw. Sh. (pp. 82 ff.), shows that several traditions of Muw. (viz, nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9) are not found in Muw. Sh.

·                       The section entitled “Kafan al‑mayyit”, (Muw., pp. 223 f.) contains three traditions, of which Muw. Sh. (p. 162) has only one (no. 1 in Muw.), a tradition from ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Amr b. al‑‘Ās. Out of the two traditions which it does not contain, one reports the manner in which the Prophet was wrapped in the coffin.

·                       The section on “Zakāt at‑fiṭr” in Muw.Sh. (p. 176) does not contain the tradition from Ibn ‘Umar found in Muw. (p.283).

·                       The traditions found in the sections of Muw. entitled “Man lā tajib ‘alayh zakāt al‑fiṭr” (p.285)” Makīlat zakāt al‑fiṭr” (p. 283), are not found at all in Muw. Sh.

·                       In the section on “Isti’dhān al‑bikr wa al‑ayyim” three tra­ditions are found in Muw. (pp. 524 f.), while only one is found in Muw. Sh. (p. 239). The missing ones include a tradition from ‑ the Prophet.[14]

·                       The section on “li‘ān” in Muw. Sh. (p. 262) does not contain several traditions found in the corresponding section in Muw. (pp. 566 ff.).

·                       The section on the prohibited forms of the sale of dates in Muw. Sh. (pp. 330 L) contains only one out of the three traditions mentioned in Muw. (pp. 623 L), even though all three go back to the Prophet.

The same can be illustrated by comparing the works of Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī, particularly Āthār A.Y. and Āthār Sh. for a large number of traditions recorded in Āthār A.Y. are not found in Āthār Sh., although the author of the former work was older.[15]

·                       Āthār A.Y., 845 a tradition from Ibn Mas‘ūd on muḍāraba is not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A.Y. 830, a tradition from the Prophet regarding disagreement on price between the buyer and the seller is not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A. Y., 666, a tradition from ‘Umar found in the section on divorce and ‘idda is not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       On the question of nafaqa and sukna’, Āthār A. Y. has several traditions, i.e. 592, 608, 726 and 728. These are not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A. Y. 704, 707 709 which are related to li‘ān are not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A. Y., 492, 092, and 696 which deal with ẓihār are not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A. Y., 857, a tradition from Silim on muzāra‘a, is not found in Āthār Sh.

·                       Āthār A.Y., 779 and 780 which refer to farā’iḍ are not found Āthār  Sh.

·                       Āthār A.Y., 399, 401, 597,607, etc., on miscellaneous subjects are not found Āthār  Sh.[16]

This shows that even though there is no reason to believe that Shaybānī did not know these traditions, his work does not record them ‑ a fact which falsifies the assumption underlying the method followed by Schacht in his attempt to establish the “growth of traditions.” In this connection the following possibilities, each one of which is plausible, have been altogether ignored.

1.           That the person concerned might have heard and then forgotten the tradition in question;[17]

2.           That he might have heard that tradition, but might not have considered it authentic;

3.       That he might have known a tradition, but owing to the fact that not the entire quantity of traditions known to the jurists has come down‑to us, especially of the jurists of the relatively early period of Islam, there is no mention of those traditions in the works presently available to us, even though those traditions might once have existed.

To brush aside all these considerations and much evidence to the contrary and insist on an immoderate scepticism can hardly be considered worthy of mature historians.

Notes and References