Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtihad
By: Muhammad Khalid Masud
Reviewed by: Dr. Mohd. Altaf Hussain Ahangar

 Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtihad, Muhammad Kahlid Masud, Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad Pakistan, 1995, PP.236.

Growing out of a research project approved by Islamic Research Institute, Pakistan with consequential publication by Iqbal Academy Pakistan, this book by Muhammad Khalid Masud has tried to highlight the vision and mission of Dr. Iqbal with regard to the Reconstruction of Ijtihad. Its text contains eight chapters of uneven length spread over 197 pages. An introduction, a conclusion, bibliography and index constitute the remaining portion of the book.

Masud’s claim that this book is the product of extensive study and research on Iqbal’s approach to Ijtihad has prompted us to assess and analyse the contribution of the learned author chapter-wise.

Chapter one is an attempt to inform the readers about the definition of Ijtihad and Mujtahid and its classification. Focus has been upon the complexity through which Ijtihad doctrine had to pass in the Indian sub-continent, i.e. how this term got linked with Qiyas, rationalism, Taqlid and so on. Apprising us with the fact that modern Mujtahid cannot funnction on Fiqh knowledge alone, we are rightly told that presently power of law-making and law-enforcing vests in a modern state and codification is the only recognisable instrument through which we can remove lacuna in Islamic law. According to Masud, "Ijtihad" constitutes and effort to opt for one of two or more possible solutions in a given situation and to provide legal justification for that solution". But the learned author fails to inform us about the material from which legal justification is to be sought. In other words, is it the justification from contemporary legal knowledge or from Quran and Hadith alone? Throughout the whole book, Masud has avoided answer to this query. How can one reconstruct Iqbal’s doctrine of Ijtihad unless this basic question is addressed? Iqbal has stressed upon the reinterpretation of foundational legal principles deduced from Quran and deferment of implementation of Quranic laws under certain specified circumstances. Tauhid, i.e., equality, solidarity and freedom, constitutes for Iqbal one of the fundamental legal principle. Likewise Iqbal considers undiscoverable the application universality of traditions of legal character and insists against indiscoverable the application universality of tradition of legal character and insists against indiscriminate use of Hadith as a source of law. Rather he favours non-consideration of Hadith for legislation purpose. In such a situation if Masud is advocating for providence of legal justification for an approved solution, then in view of Iqbal’s thinking what are the parameters within which the justification is to be sought? Masud has surely failed to address this problem.

Chapter 2 factually professes to deal with the development of Ijtihad in subcontinent but practically it highlights the legal philosophy of Shah Wali-ullah. Perhaps the object is to lend credibility to Iqbal’s view on Hadith with which Masud has scarcely dealt with in this book. The learned author is absolutely right in contending that "Shah Wali-ullah’s views on Ijtihad, Taqlid and development of Islamic law contributed a great deal to the formation f Iqbal’s views on Ijtihad". In this chapter, the critical analysis of views of Shah and Iqbal would have been within the scope of the book, but for some inexplicable reasons it has not been done. Under the title "Semantic Development of the Concpet of Ijtihad" , chapter 3 is an attempt to familiarize the readers with views of personalities like Shah Ismail Shahid, Nadhir Hussain Dahlawi, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din Afghani, Renan, Halim Pasha, Abul Kalam Azad, Zia Gokalp and Aghnides relating to Ijtihad, Taqlid, Islam etc. Convincingly one is acquainted with the manner in which Ijtihad was employed by various movements in view of social, economic and political changes in the subcontinent. The focal point of this chapter is the observation of Aghnides that "Ijtihad was in fact a mechanical principle that led Islamic society to fossilization and prevented it from progress". It is indeed this statement, we are rightly informed, which proved motivational force for Iqbal’s writing of his lecture "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam".

Chapter 4 under the title "Iqbal’s lecture on Ijtihad" tries to solve the riddle as to whether the lecture was written in 1920 or it was still under preparation in 1925. Doubts are also cast as to whether the present article is the original article because despite all efforts original manuscript could not be found. Besides, this chapter enlists the names of jurists whose works were consulted by Iqbal during the writing of Ijtihad lecture. We are of the opinion that this chapter has no practical utility for a student of Islamic law or even for those from other disciplines. It may have some fanciful relevance to those who attach undue importance to secondary matters while ignoring the primary one.

Chapter 5 clarifies magnificiently the distinctive features of mechanism in relation to dynamism and highlights how Iqbal focused on dynamic character of universe, Islamic mode of prayer, self, Quran and Ijtihad. With regard to Ijtihad, we are introduced to five dynamic elements in Iqbal’s thought i.e., Quran’s anti-classical spirit; dynamic concept of universe, society and culture in Islam; the idea of the changeability of the life, the realism of juristic reasoning in Islam and the evolutionary and dynamic concept of intellect and thought in Islam. We are also informed about Iqbal’s refutations of Aghnides’ observation that "Islamic system of law does not possess evolutionary view of life and the qualifications and limitations for Ijtihad illustrate the mechanical nature of law". For Iqbal the conflict between the legists of Hijaz and Iraq, instead of warranting stagnation, became a source of life and movement in the law of Islam. Besides, we are also confronted in these pages with the anti-pathy of Iqbal to rationalism and his advice to leaders of the world today to understand the real meaning of what has happened in Europe and then to move forward with self-control and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social policy. This chapter also provides us an insight why Iqbal preferred Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam rather than Reformation and modernization. According to Iqbal, Reconstruction aims at restoring the original universalism and dynamism of Islam, which object cannot be achieved by adopting the terms "reformation" and "modernisation".

The meaning of Ijtihad, from legal viewpoint has also been introduced in this chapter. We are rightly told that Iqbal rejects both school-related and problem-related authority in law-making but stands for complete authority in law-making. As a prelude to Iqbal’s thought, the learned author familiarises us with Iqbal’s poetic verses some opposing and some supporting Ijtihad. One of the conclusions of the author about taqlid-sanctioning verses is that "to concluded from these verses that Iqbal supported taqlid against ijtihad would certainly constitute a grave misunderstanding of Iqbal’s thought". We fail to support this argument of the author fully. There is every possibility that Iqbal stood sincerely for taqlid in early days of his life and later changing scenario changed his vision and mission. If time factor is ignored in assessing Iqbal’s thought, then surely one can read in these verses that Iqbal had reposed his impeccable faith in taqlid. Our view is also shared by B.A. Dar’s conclusion about Iqbal’s Taqlid verses quoted by the author himself.

However, the magnificence and the beauty of this chapter has been eroded by Masud by juxtaposition of his views with that of Iqbal and self - contradiction in his conclusions.

Attributing the statement to Iqbal, Masud writes:

"He (Iqbal) explains that so many limitations and qualifications were added to the requirements for the exercise of Ijtihad and that these qualifications were made so difficult to attain, that it became well nigh impossible for any individual to exercise Ijtihad. This criticism of any qualifications is, however, rather exaggerated. The view that Ijtihad was impossible due to impossible qualifications is in fact the idea of many modern writers. The conservatives stress this point to prove the validity of Taqlid. The modernists cite it to prove the stubborn conservatism of the traditionalists". (pp 125-126)

The fact is that Iqbal’s real statement is only from "He ... to exercise Ijtihad". The words this "criticism ... traditionalists" are Masud’s own observations. However, the way the statement has been foot-noted, creates an impression that Iqbal suffers from inconsistency and ambiguity with regard to qualifications of Mujtahid.

Besides in response to Iqbal’s argument that `qualifications for exercise of Ijtihad were made so difficult to attain ...’. The learned author has come out with the observation that five qualifications for exercise of Ijtihad, viz, Knowledge of Book, Sunnah, precedents of Ijma, Qiyas and Arabic are neither impossible to attain nor are they irrelevant or unnecessarily imposed in order to make Ijtihad impossible. He refers extensively in this regard to the views of Al-Ghazali and Abu Zahra. After so much of deliberations and justifications, Masud contends that "these qualifications are nevertheless insufficient for Ijtihad in modern times. The progress that human knowledge has made these days, the breadth of scope and the depth that it has gained demand revision of these qualifications".

Iqbal is in essence the product of 20th century. He realized the fact that one-man Ijtihad is no more possible and earlier qualifications of Mujtahid are impracticable in view of broadening human knowledge. If, in above lines Masud also shares the same viewpoint, then what purpose it has served him to defend classical qualifications of Ijtihad. Besides, if a person acquires five qualifications outlined by Masud for exercising Ijtihad, then how the attainment of these qualifications would help him in comprehending the intricacies of cyberspace, teleconferencing, contemporary economic propositions and other realities of this temporal world. Self-contradiction in Masud’s observation is writ large.

Under the title `Law, State and Ulama’, chapter 6 introduces us the definition of Ijma and also provides us an insight into debates relating to khilafat. We are told that the principle of election is the principle of Quran and the will of whole Muslim community is the further source of law. Consistent with Iqbal’s views, it is said that Turkish development is a demonstrative spirit of Islam. For Ijma, author contends, one has to be familiar with several sciences and traditional scholars cannot alone exercise Ijtihad. The proposed solution lies in an institution where experts on these sciences may sit together with traditional scholars to deliberate on such matters. Masud rightly informs us that Iqbal reviewed two methods of Ulama’s participation in politics namely method adopted under 1906 constitution of Iran wherein ulama consider themselves entitled to supervise the whole life of community and secondly the formation of assembly of ulama, independent of legislature. Masud has in this chapter successfully forged a link of khilafat with Ijtihad and Ijam. Despite the overall relevance of this chapter we find a conflicting entry in this chapter. Masud writes that "Iqbal’s reconstruction of Ijma places emphasis on the participation of common man in the process of law-making". The fact is that Iqbal never favoured a common man participation in legislation; he advocated the participation of those laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. Thus every Tom and Harry cannot have a participatory role in law-making process of a Muslim nation. Later, Masud also reaches the same conclusion when he says that ‘Iqbal stresses the significance of layman’s contribution due to latter’s keen insight in this affairs’.

In order to highlight the practical demonstration of Ulama’s role in legislative process, chapter 7 under the title `Justice, Law, and Reform’ familiarizes us with the historical background of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Under the pretension of highlightening the development of public opinion on the need to reform those Islamic laws that caused hardship for Muslim women, the 22 page chapter introduces us Islamic law relating to apostasy, judicial precedents leading to apostasy and the contribution of Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi towards the enactment of the above Act. Iqbal in his lecture did not only deal with apostasy but also talked about polygamy, inheritance and divorce rights of females. It is an open truth that Iqbal considered polygamy as `religio-legal excuse to the rich for adultery’. Although polygamy has not been banned in Pakistan but legislatively it is controlled under sec.6 of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961. Author to refer to this piece of legislation. Besides, author had an ample opportunity of discussing inheritance rights of female from Iqbal’s viewpoint but no such details have been provided.

Besides, in contradiction to Iqbal’s stand on Hanafi approach to Hadith, Masud claims that `Hanafis accepted not only ahadith that were marfu but also the mursal’. We are also told that `Hanafis tended to reject a deduction based on pure qiyas in favour of a mursal hadith and it was often called Istihsan’. We consider all these arguments pure conjectures because no authority has been cited by Masud to reinforce his argument.

Chapter 8 professing to have "an analytical review of the criticism of Iqbal’s lecture" contains the maze of criticism against Iqbal’s lecture from Muslim and non-Muslim critics. Masud has forcefully neutralized Bahi’s criticism regarding the reference of orientalists by Iqbal in his lecture. However, this forcefulness is nowhere visible when Masud tries to counter Gibb’s allegation that ‘Iqbal bypassed problem of divorce to concentrate on the easier problem of inheritance". In response Masud writes that it were "the Iqbal’s remarks and strong pleas that generated the process of legal reform providing Muslim women the right of dissolution of marriage". Masud’s contention is partially irrelevant. Iqbal did not discuss divorce right of females in general but only concentrated on apostasy aspect whereby he concluded that `Hanafi law on apostasy was not protecting the religion but was rather forcing women to abandon the religion". Besides, when Zia Gokalp talked about inequality in divorce, he was mainly concerned with the husband’s right of Talaq especially Triple Talaq. No one can dispute this fact that in most Muslim countries this privilege continues with the husband without any parallel right in the wife.

Likewise, we fail to agree with Masud that absence of details on divorce in Reconstruction `reflects Iqbal’s view that legal reform should be in response to a social need’. In reality, Iqbal had no material to counter Gibb’s argument and so he avoided full discussion on this issue by contending that "the wife at the time of marriage is at liberty to get the husband’s power of divorce delegated to her on stated conditions and thus secure equality of divorce with her hunband". No one can deny that only few husbands would like to compromise with their right of Talaq. Additionally, in Indian sub-continent women have actually suffered a lot on account of the way the Talaq power is exercised by the husband. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 has not disturbed the classical law of Triple divorce, although some procedural limitations have been enacted under section 7 of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961. There was surely a social need existing during Iqbal’s time to reform Hanafi law relating to Talaq in accordance with Quranic injunctions but for cultural ethos in the subcontinent it could not mature at all.

Further the objectionable part of this chapter is the reference to Iqbal’s views on Quran and Hadith. As contended earlier, Iqbal’s views on legal relevance of Quran and Hadith should have been the subject of inquiry and discussion in a separate chapter because that would have identified the frontiers within which the right of Ijtihad has to be exercised. However Masud does not depict Iqbal’s views in true spirit when he says: "Iqbal considered principles in Quran were eternal whereas legality of Hadith disturbed him". As contended earlier, all legal verses in Quran were not eternal for Iqbal. He was simply concerned with foundational legal principles. Regarding Hadith Iqbal stands for an outright non-consideration of it in legal matters and so the question of the legality of Hadith disturbing him does not arise.

In its two page conclusion, Masud has realistically argued that the study of Iqbal’s reconstruction of Ijtihad in its doctrinal, historical and semantic context was necessarey for proper evaluation of Iqbal’s contribution. Masud, inter alia, impliedly endorses Iqbal’s creation of an institution in the form of Legislative Assembly by the combination of Ijtihad and Ijma institutions. We are told that constitutional development in Pakistan are reflecting Iqbal’s reconstruction of Ijtihad particularly the participatory role of Ulama. Here we want to make it clear that Iqbal endorses the participatory role of Ulama only when they happen to be the members of the legislature. Otherwise their role is merely recommendatory i.e. they are supposed to help and guide free discussions on questions relating to law. In other words, if a conflict emerges regarding a future enactment, then it will be the will of the legislative assembly which would prevail over the reasoning of the Ulama. While commenting upon the role of Ulama from Iqbal’s viewpoint, Pakistan Supreme Court in Khurshid Jane V. Fazal Dad, PLD 1964 (W. P) Lahore 558 observed:

Two distinct thoughts are visible in these observations. One that the legislative assemblies of the modern state may assume the role of Ijma‘ and other that the sovereignty of the legislature should not be impaired by subjecting it to the authority of an external organ.

In conclusion, Masud’s book has indeed tried to interweave the loose threads of discussions, informations and explanations regarding Iqbal’s views on Ijtihad. However, the failure to shed light on the frontiers within which Ijtihad has to be exercised coupled with entries of juxtaposition and self- contradiction has not fully helped in fulfillment of aims of this book advanced by the author in the introduction, i.e. ‘forestalling the shortcomings of the partial and pedestrian studies which are not suitable for the appreciation of thinkers like Iqbal who are themselves perpetually involved in the process of reform’.